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Ethics of Mediation and the Voice of the Injured Subject
Mirca Madianou
One of the topics to emerge from the Leveson Inquiry on the culture, practice and ethics of the press<xen>1</xen> in the UK concerns the experiences of those who had been unwillingly exposed or mistreated by the tabloid press. The constant theme in these often poignant accounts is the feeling of violation and vulnerability that individuals – both celebrities and ordinary members of the public – experienced, not only in the context of the phone-hacking scandal but also in several other instances of tabloid journalism. This was a rather rare moment when the voice of the injured subject was granted visibility.
Why does it matter to understand the voice of the injured subject? First, there are democratic and ethical reasons. If the ability to give an account of oneself is an essential feature of what it is to be human, voice is understood not just as a process but also as a human value (Couldry 2010: 1) which matters for democracy, justice and development. In this chapter I argue that listening to the voice of the wronged subject also matters in social science research because it gives us insight into the workings of mediation, still profoundly asymmetrical despite digital developments. Understanding the symbolic power of mediation is an important starting-point for any discussion of media ethics. This is because mediated communication, whether it involves traditional media institutions or individuals using digital platforms, is fundamentally different from face-to-face communication. Yet approaches to liberal media ethics often presuppose a model of communication as co-presence. Understanding the workings of mediation is important for arguing why freedom of expression – an individual right – cannot be applied to media institutions, a point eloquently made by Onora O’Neill (see Chapter 2 this volume). Here I argue that this argument is justified not only because media institutions – unlike individual subjects – are powerful organizations which need to be accountable (see O’Neill, Chapter 2 this volume) but also because communication through media, whether traditional mass media or new digital platforms, is structurally different from communication in a situation of co-presence. The media are not neutral conveyors of meaning; mediated communication is asymmetrically structured and its structuring inevitably shapes the experience of communication. As our lives are increasingly connected by – even lived in – media (Deuze 2012), we need to understand the structural transformation of mediated communication and its consequences when thinking through the ethics of media.
In order to illustrate the asymmetrical structure of mediation, this chapter will draw on the narrative accounts of people who found themselves inadvertently exposed by the media. The perspective of the wronged subject juxtaposed with the symbolic power of media institutions reveals the asymmetries of mediation in a very powerful way. Listening to the voice of the injured subject, although revealing, is not common practice. Such accounts are not readily available – wronged subjects are often silent – and when they do exist their voices are often drowned amongst the louder ones of more powerful institutions, such as the media themselves. This chapter draws on a rare occasion when the voices of those who had negative direct experiences with the media were publicly recorded. I analyse here the witness statements at the Leveson Inquiry, which was set up in July 2011 in order to investigate ‘the relationship of the press with the public, police and politicians’ following the phone-hacking scandal.<xen>2</xen> I focus in particular on the evidence provided to the Inquiry during Module 1: ‘the relationship between the press and the public’ focusing on ‘phone hacking and other potentially illegal behaviour’ and its consequences for the people affected.<xen>3</xen> The witness statements and inquiry proceedings – all publicly available on the Inquiry’s website – provide a rich account of the experiences of those who found themselves inadvertently exposed in the news. Although several of the witnesses in the Leveson Inquiry were celebrities, who are already used to media exposure and who presumably possess the cultural, social and economic capital to respond to the media, many of the witnesses were people who found themselves in the public spotlight because of circumstances that were not of their own making. Such cases included members of the public who suffered the loss of a family member (the Bowles, Dowler, McCann and Watson families); who were wrongly accused of a crime (Christopher Jefferies); or worked for someone famous (Mary Ellen Field). My analysis has examined these accounts as well as the accounts of some celebrities, such as Max Mosley, who reported mistreatments in the hands of the tabloid press.<xen>4</xen>
More difficult to identify are the cases when wronged subjects do not seek, or are not given the opportunity, to reply to the media. Given that these accounts and narratives are not publicly articulated they are harder to find and to assess. Social research has a bias for studying voice, for it is hard – if not impossible – to study silence. In my past research on news consumption I came across examples of participants who privately (in the interview context) expressed their disaffection or disenfranchisement with the news media and mediated public life in general (Madianou 2005a; 2012). To complement the analysis of the publicly articulated voices in the Leveson witness transcripts I will refer to this earlier work, which concerns the members of a minority group in Athens, Greece, and the narrative of a working-class English woman from East London. In both of these examples the disaffection expressed towards the media was largely due to people’s negative personal experiences with the news media and journalists. In neither of these cases did participants reply to the news media in an attempt to correct their distorted representation. In this sense, both cases represent examples of ‘silenced’ voices. Understanding silenced voices matters particularly because it contributes to understanding the reasons which caused this silence – what Butler calls the materialization process (Butler 2005; see also Couldry 2010: 3).
The final example which I will consider here acknowledges that it is not just media institutions that can inflict harm. Individuals use digital platforms to produce their own content and this communication is a form of mediation. The case discussed here is one of unwanted mediated exposure through social media and the equally mediated response by the exposed subject. This is the 2012 ‘sex-tape’ scandal involving the British popstar and television presenter Tulisa Contostavlos, who responded to her ex-partner’s secretly filmed intimate YouTube video with a recorded reply (again on YouTube) in which she ‘set the record straight’ (Wiseman 2012). That case reminds us that mediated harm can be the result of personal use of social media, although in this example there was, comparatively, more symmetry in the media used for exposure and reparation.
Although these three types of account are taken from very different empirical contexts they are representative enough to illustrate the argument that our ethics of media discussion has to take into account an understanding of the workings of mediation and its symbolic power. Even though it is not the intention of this chapter to balance the tensions between generic notions of freedom of expression and privacy (for a discussion, see Gies 2007),<xen>5</xen> some conceptual clarity is necessary. Freedom of expression has become the generic term to refer to the freedom of speech both of individuals and of media institutions (for a discussion, see O’Neill, Chapter 2 this volume),<xen>6</xen> and collapsing individual self-expression and press freedom leads to confusion. In Mill’s classic text (1989), self-expression was a means to protect individuality, so it is clear that the idea of self-expression cannot be applied to institutions such as the press or the media. Apart from arguing that freedom of expression becomes an altogether different category in conditions of mediation, I also observe that the individual right of freedom of expression cannot be straightforwardly applied to individuals acting through digital platforms because mediated communication engenders new forms of harm which would not have been possible otherwise. Listening to the voices – or lack thereof – of exposed subjects will reveal that mediation has the potential to amplify the emotional consequences of negative media exposure with serious practical and symbolic consequences for the individuals concerned. One of the consequences is the potential silencing of individuals, which also has implications for the normative project of voice as value (Couldry 2010).
Theoretically, this chapter draws on theories of mediation (Livingstone 2009; Madianou 2012; Silverstone 2005; Thompson 1995) and mediatization (Couldry 2012; Hepp 2012; Lundby 2009). By focusing on the perspective of the injured subject it contributes a ‘bottom-up’ perspective to this volume and the media ethics literature more broadly, which only recently has started to address the question of audiences.<xen>7</xen> The following paragraphs focus on the concepts of mediation, voice and harm.
Voice, harm and the architectures of mediation
This chapter is concerned with how voice and harm are transformed in the context of mediated communication. Being able to express an opinion and give an account of oneself is a fundamentally human need (Butler 2005; see also Couldry 2010: 7). Having a voice is also integral to the struggle for recognition (Honneth 1996; 2007) and visibility in the increasingly media-saturated social and political life. The sociological study of voice is distinct but interconnected to the normative dimension of voice as value (Couldry 2010), and the imperative to support a ‘moral culture’ that can counter the negative consequences of harm, disrespect and social exclusion by empowering those individuals who feel disrespected to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere (Honneth 2007: 78). It is only by understanding the harmful processes which obstruct voice – what Butler (2005) calls materialization – that we can develop a normative framework of ethics of media. Here I will argue that mediation may be an important factor that can potentially contribute to, or accentuate, the silencing of voices in situations of unwanted exposure. Understanding the workings of mediation is fundamental to any discussion of media ethics and for the support of moral cultures of recognition (Honneth 1996).
Mediation refers to the structural transformation which occurs with the introduction of media in the context of communication.<xen>8</xen> At a first level this means that mediated communication is not the same as face-to-face communication. Mediation introduces technological, institutional and economic parameters to the communication context while it also affords certain interactions but not others. Writing in 1995 and therefore before the proliferation of digital interactive communication technologies, Thompson developed a typology between face-to – face, mediated and quasi-interactive mediated communication (Thompson 1995). His argument is that face-to-face communication is fundamentally different from mediated communication (e.g. the communication between two individuals through phone calls) and mediated quasi-interactive communication, which is the communication through traditional media, such as the press and television, which are largely monological. The fact that mediated quasi-interactive communication can reach large audiences which are despatialized gives rise to ‘a new visibility’: a new mediated social relationship between the audience and the broadcast individual which is no longer reciprocal in character (Thompson 2005): ‘Individuals can be seen by many viewers without themselves being able to see these viewers’ (Thompson 2005: 35). Although the new visibility has been discussed in terms of its consequences for the political sphere (Thompson 2000; 2005), in my earlier work I became interested in the consequences of mediated visibility for ordinary members of the public in situations of unwanted exposure when individuals cannot interject their own account as they will never know all the readers who read their private story (Madianou 2012).
The recent technological convergence has a number of implications for mediation. The proliferation of communication technologies and platforms which continually intersect means that both mediated communication and communication through traditional media are no longer sustained by one medium or technology, but through an integrated assembly of media that form an environment of polymedia (Madianou and Miller 2013). In the case of interpersonal communication, individuals can choose from an environment of communicative opportunities and affordances in order to suit the relationships and purposes in question (Madianou and Miller 2013). Convergence is also evident in journalistic practices (Deuze 2004), while the proliferation of news platforms can even lead to the decentralization of news narratives, as is evident in the discussion of ‘polymedia events’ when news stories unfold across a range of platforms as part of the polymedia environment (Madianou 2013). Moreover, convergence unsettles typologies such as Thompson’s (1995) discussed in the previous paragraphs as the boundaries between mediated and mediated quasi-interactive communication become blurred. With interactive technologies enabled within traditional one-to-many media and vice versa, the potential for audiences to publicly articulate their voice is stronger than ever before.
These observations, however, should not be interpreted as evidence that the symbolic power of mediation is weakened. In the case of news, the affordances of new communication technologies can even heighten the effects of mediation. For example, the fact that online news content is no longer ephemeral but permanent and retrievable potentially increases the size of audiences attending to the message exponentially. In this case the affordances of an internet-mediated platform have implications for the temporality and reach of the message without fundamentally transforming the structure of mediated communication. Even in the case of citizen journalism, which is inevitably centred on the promise of voice, there are evident asymmetries when it comes to whose voice is articulated and, ultimately, listened to (Chouliaraki 2013). Finally, the fact that personal communication is increasingly conducted via digital platforms means that it can acquire features of ‘quasi-interactive’, or mass mediated communication. The collapse of private and public boundaries on social media such as Facebook and Twitter can lead to personal views being broadcast to infinite audiences (Marwick and boyd 2011). As the widely reported UK case of Paul Chambers highlighted, what would have been an innocuous joke about blowing up an airport, had it been mentioned in the course of a personal conversation, led to his arrest for inciting terrorism when it appeared on Twitter.​[1]​ Mentioning terrorism on Twitter seems to be the equivalent of ‘shouting “fire!” in a crowded theatre’. The media, broadly defined, can create new forms of harm; in order to address the ethical implications of mediated harm, we first need to comprehend the architectures of mediation.
Apart from referring to the transformation that occurs with the introduction of media in social communication, the concept of mediation can also capture deeper, cumulative social consequences that extend beyond a specific communicative context. Described by Silverstone as a fundamentally ‘dialectical process’ (2005), mediation also refers to the ways in which media technologies transform social processes whilst being socially shaped themselves. Here mediation converges with the parallel term ‘mediatization’ (Couldry 2012; Hepp 2012). Mediation does not just alter the relationship between the particular exposed subject and its audience; it introduces a new mode of relating at a distance which has implications for a number of processes, including the broader conduct of politics (see Langer 2011 on the personalization of politics and Thompson 2000 on mediated political scandal). The following empirical discussion will reveal the emergence of a new form of mediated harm, which is qualitatively different from the harm that occurs in non-mediated environments. Unpacking this mediated harm is an essential first task for the conversation on ethics of media.
Listening to the voices of the injured subjects<xen>9 

</xen>Violation and loss of control

The most prominent theme when reading the witness statements of the Leveson Inquiry is the profound feeling of violation and loss of control that members of the public experienced when they found themselves in the public spotlight. This applies most poignantly to those individuals and families who attracted the attention of the media under the tragic circumstances of losing a family member or being wrongly accused of a crime. Their invasion of privacy heightened what was already a dramatic situation of dealing with death, loss or false accusations. Given such harsh circumstances it is not surprising that some witnesses used very powerful terms to describe their experiences. For Kate McCann, the mother of the missing toddler Madeleine who vanished in Portugal in 2007, the publication of her private diaries by a Portuguese and British tabloid amounted to ‘mental rape’. Sally and Bob Dowler, parents of the murdered schoolgirl Milly, expressed their situation very clearly:
What we did not appreciate was the extent to which newspapers would intrude on our private turmoil and how little control we would have over where the lines were drawn in that respect. (Sally and Bob Dowler, joint witness statement, paragraph 6)

In their joint statement, the Dowlers describe their distress when they saw the publication of a private moment during which the mother, Sally, was photographed breaking down as she touched a poster of her then missing daughter. This image, which appeared in a tabloid newspaper, was taken during a private walk to retrace Milly’s steps before her disappearance. It later emerged that the details of this private walk had become known to the reporters illegally through the hacking of the Dowlers’ mobile phones. ‘It was distressing to think that someone had been secretly photographing us during this intensely private moment’ (Sally and Bob Dowler, joint witness statement, paragraph 7). Other families, such as the McCanns, reported direct confrontations with journalists who camped outside their home, tapped on their car windows and chased the family as they exited their house in order to take pictures that could then be used in the news.
Infinite audiences
One of the great transformations of mediation is the size of the audience which attends to the message. Even though face-to-face exposure might still have been distressing or unpleasant, it would involve a finite audience, largely known to the subject, who could in turn approach the audience and try to set the record straight. In a mediated context this is simply not possible. The publication of a story introduces a different scale to the experience: the audience is potentially infinite and at the same time unknown to the exposed subject. Moreover, it is dispersed spatially as the exposed individual and his/her audiences do not have to share the same location. This can be understood as an example of the ‘new visibility’ (Thompson 2005) to refer to the new social relationship between the broadcast individual and his/her audiences. Listen to Max Mosley, former president of Federation Internationale d’Automobile, who found himself involved in a widely reported sex scandal: ‘Everytime I visit a restaurant or shop anywhere in the world, I have to prepare myself that the individuals working there or other customers know’ (Witness statement by Max Mosley, paragraph 68).
This theme is echoed in the statement by Giles Crown on behalf of Edward Bowles, father of Sebastian, the 11-year-old boy killed in a bus accident in a Swiss motorway tunnel during a school ski trip in 2012. One of the most poignant moments in that statement concerns the publication of a photograph of the 9-year-old daughter of the family grieving over the death of her brother (Giles Crown witness statement, paragraph 10). The ‘Helena photograph’ (as it became known) also appeared in the Belgian media, including the cover or a popular magazine: ‘Edward saw the magazine in a supermarket whist with Helena as it was prominently displayed beside the narrow entrance to the main body of the shop and they were both very upset by it. As they passed it, another member of the public pointed to them both’ (Giles Crown witness statement, paragraph 22).
The consequences of this exposure to a deterritorialized and potentially infinite audience can be devastating. Christopher Jefferies, who had been wrongly accused for the murder of a young Bristol architect in 2011, found himself in what can be described as a public witch-hunt. Even though another man was eventually arrested and convicted of the murder, the press coverage about him was so intense and so negative that
after being released on bail I spent almost 3 months confined to my friends’ houses. Even after I returned home and tried to return to some form of normality, I remember being very apprehensive about going into cafes or shops because I did not know how people would react to me. (Christopher Jefferies witness statement, paragraph 53)

The McCanns describe how they encountered their audience through the hate mail they received during the first year after their daughters’ disappearance: 

‘During this time we also received a large volume of hate mail including a death threat which I believe was largely attributable to these articles and their reporting of the investigation.’ (Witness statement Gerry McCann, paragraph 45)

What emerges from these statements is that the effects of the sheer size and abstract nature of the audience have tangible consequences for the exposed individuals, illustrated by their unwanted recognition by people they don’t know. None of the witnesses wanted to be recognized for the circumstances for which they attracted publicity. Yet it is precisely for those circumstances that they were fingerpointed in public. This is a case of mediated quasi-interaction in the sense that the exposed subjects found themselves in largely non-reciprocal communication with members of the audience. People whom they would never know became aware of some very private moments and details, with harmful consequences for the exposed individuals.
Commodification and economics
A significant dimension of the publication of these private stories is the feeling that these private lives and tragic circumstances are effectively sold for advertising revenue. This is expressed most clearly by Gerry McCann and Max Mosley, and it is worth quoting them at length:
This suggested that the newspapers were demanding stories as they were commercially valuable to them and/or because they had to keep up with their competitors. This was confirmed by Peter Hill, the then editor of the Daily Express, who admitted to the Culture, Media and Sport Committee in 2009 that ‘[these stories] certainly increased the circulation of the Daily Express by many thousands on those days without a doubt’ … [The editors] considered their ability to make money from the additional sales of the newspapers carrying the stories to be more important than taking into account our legitimate concerns as to the accuracy of the reporting and the effect it would have on our family – most significantly the search for, and well-being of our missing daughter. (Gerry McCann, paragraphs 39 and 61)

Later that year the News of the World would boast of the unprecedented 600% growth in traffic to its website driven by exclusives such as the Max Mosley video. The boast can only have been made to attract greater number of sponsors and advertisers and their revenue. (Max Mosley witness statement, paragraph 64)

Such views are not even contested by the media representatives themselves. Richard Desmond, owner of The Express newspapers, admitted at the inquiry that the McCann stories increased the papers circulation (Transcript of Afternoon Hearing). Trevor Kavanagh (associate editor of The Sun, one of the Murdoch-owned newspapers implicated in the hacking scandal that sparked the inquiry) stated in his own evidence: ‘news is as saleable a commodity as any other; newspapers are commercial, competitive businesses, not a public service’ (Trevor Kavanagh, witness statement). Such statements, including Richard Desmond’s provocative ‘I don’t understand the meaning of the word ethics’ and ‘if you agree that newspapers are important they should be allowed to report on opinions’ suggest that in certain quarters the notion of press freedom is synonymous with the freedom of the market to do as it pleases (Fenton 2013). Collapsing freedom of expression, democracy and free market in one category is not only conceptually flawed but also practically dangerous.
The power asymmetry between individuals and media institutions is also felt at an economic level. Witnesses said that dealing with the press was extraordinarily all-consuming as well as extremely expensive. Those affected often had to hire professionals to deal with the situation (e.g. the McCann family), as well as with lengthy and costly lawsuits. Max Mosley provides clear evidence for this: To date I estimate that I have spent well over five hundred thousand pounds attempting to deal with the consequences of the publication of the Article on the Internet (Max Mosley witness statement).
Given these conditions and the fact that a lawsuit will almost certainly intensify media coverage, it is not surprising that many witnesses to the inquiry decided not to take action.
Technological convergence
The effects of mediation through traditional news media outlets are heightened in a converged media environment. For example, the publication of news stories online makes their content more permanent, in the sense of permanently retrievable. This has implications for the temporality of the news story which can potentially be viewed by an ever-proliferating audience as stories can be forwarded and reposted while videos and photographs can be embedded in other platforms, such as social media. News stories can go ‘viral’ in a converged media environment as they spread through a range of platforms which elsewhere I have theorized as ‘polymedia storytelling’ (Madianou 2013), drawing on the theory of polymedia developed in the context of interpersonal communication (Madianou and Miller 2013). Audiences for online news are further deterritorialized and not confined to the traditional boundaries of national publics. Additionally, audiences are temporally diffused as the message is permanently available and can be accessed long after the initial publication or broadcast. In sum, the permanence of content, and its storage capacity, retrievability and reach, are features of online news mediation which accentuate traditional news mediation. The following extract from Max Mosley’s witness statement (paragraph 62) clearly illustrates the above points: ‘the article was viewed 435,000 times (during its two days online) while the video footage available on the website was viewed 1,424,959 times’.
In a digital media environment it is possible to know the number of times a video or a picture has been viewed but, far from personalizing the exposed individual’s relationship to their audience, the number of views highlights the abstract nature of the audience and the message’s potentially infinite reach. The permanence of content is evident in Mosley’s experience. Although he was successful in legally getting the newspaper to remove the defamatory content from its own website, it was impossible to fully remove all relevant content from the web:
Although the amount of material available on the internet has been greatly reduced, it is still available. Despite this ongoing investment, I have to live with the knowledge that it will probably never be fully removed … In effect the information I wished to keep private and which the News of the World was held to have published unlawfully will forever be known and accessible to the world at large. (Mosley witness statement, paragraph 67)

Digital media operate in synergy with traditional news media. Despite their interactive nature, digital platforms when exploited by mainstream media appear to heighten the effects of traditional news mediation. The affordances of internet-mediated platforms (e.g. the permanence of content, storage capacity, retrievability and reach) can accentuate the effects of mediation and its asymmetrical power structure. Note that this observation applies to the use of digital media by mainstream media organizations and is not meant as an inherent feature of all new media platforms, some of which can potentially offer opportunities for voice – a point to which we shall return later in the chapter.
Voiceless
The Leveson Inquiry witness statements provide highly articulate accounts of the consequences of invasion of privacy and even defamation.<xen>10</xen> What makes these accounts particularly poignant apart from the individual circumstances is the fact that more often than not wronged subjects do not have the opportunity to express their negative direct experiences with the media. In an attempt to cast some light on this apparent lack of data, I here return to my earlier work on news consumption where I encountered two such cases of media injury. The first example is the story of Laura, a young working-class woman from Dagenham, East London, who had found her experiences as an underage mother reported in the local newspaper (Madianou 2012).
I met Laura as part of my study on news in everyday life. For her, news was not relevant in her everyday life and it quickly emerged that her early direct experience with the news media prevented her from trusting journalists. The publication of her story to a potentially infinite audience introduced a structural transformation: the others through whom she defined herself were multiplied and at the same time generalized as an abstract category of individuals whom she could never meet to articulate her own version of events. Laura never even thought of writing a letter to the editor as an attempt to set the record straight, which suggests that the asymmetries of mediation converge with other social inequalities. A working-class teenage woman, she remained voiceless in contrast with the celebrity witnesses of the Leveson Inquiry, such as Max Mosley and Hugh Grant, who were prepared to take a stand. The publication of Laura’s story to a potentially infinite audience, the indifference with which her private life was publically judged<xen>11</xen> and her own inability to respond accentuated feelings of shame and pointed to the symbolic power of mediation. This experience left its indelible marks as it framed Laura’s wider attitude towards journalists, the news and public life more generally.
The symbolic power of mediation can affect social groups and not just individuals. In my work with members of the Turkish-speaking minority in Athens as part of a wider study of media, nationalism and identities in Greece (Madianou 2005a), I encountered anger, disaffection and withdrawal among members of the community who felt that their neighbourhood was systematically misrepresented by the national press. Participants brought up several examples of personal contact with journalists when ‘their words’ had been twisted or taken out of context (Madianou 2005b: 532–536). This negative experience with journalists echoed wider social inequalities and exclusions, such as discrimination in the job market and housing. When I asked members of the neighbourhood if they had ever considered setting up a local radio station, they ‘hadn’t even thought about it’. ‘They wouldn’t even let us’, said one of my participants, revealing the extent of deep disempowerment and lack of confidence (Madianou 2005b: 535). Elsewhere I argued that this can be understood as an example of mediation as different media-related experiences converge: the negative experiences with the media frame (Couldry 2000) affected the participants’ trust in media, which in turn shaped their interpretation of the news and their wider sense of public disconnection, while the combination of all of these factors contributed to the degree of disempowerment revealed in the lack of any enthusiasm to establish community media that could potentially make their voices heard (Madianou 2005b: 535). This example, which is typical of the struggle – and failure – for recognition (Honneth 1996), shows how mediation can converge with other social processes and ultimately accentuate a cycle of disrespect (Honneth 2007), social exclusion and boundary-making (Madianou 2005b) which can potentially have wider consequences for public life and democracy.
Mediated harm and reparation through digital platforms
As a counterpoint to the above examples we finally consider a case of individual use of social media and its harmful consequences, as well as the opportunities for reparation afforded by digital platforms. This is the sex-tape scandal involving the British popstar and television presenter Tulisa Contostavlos, an intimate tape of whom was uploaded on the social platform YouTube on 17 March  2012 by her ex-boyfriend (as he later admitted in court). In this example, a personal (rather than institutional) act of communication, which clearly intended to harm, was amplified through its mediation as the offensive video was viewed by millions of viewers globally. At one level the dissemination of a scandalous video via social media, even if initiated by a private individual, shares some of the features of traditional mediation. Social media like YouTube (owned by the internet giant Google) are largely centralized institutions and dominant online players. Still this case is interesting in that Contostavlos used precisely the same platform to record her own version of events. Days after the offensive video appeared online and as various media platforms, old and new, were quick to brand her a ‘slut’ (Wiseman 2012), Contostavlos uploaded her own video in which, in her own voice, she gives her account:
When you share an intimate moment with someone you love, that you care about and trust you never imagine that at any point it will be shared with people around the world … It’s a pretty tough time for me, but I don’t feel I should be the one to take the heat for it. This is something he took upon himself, to put the footage online… I’m not going to sit here and be violated or taken advantage of. <xen>12</xen>

The Contostavlos case ended with her winning a court apology by her ex-boyfriend in July 2012. As a result of the litigation, 60 websites were forced to remove the offensive content.<xen>13</xen> To some extent this example suggests that interactive platforms overcome the largely monological nature of quasi-interactive mediated communication (Thompson 1995) in the sense that the injured subject can directly address his/her audience in a way that the exposed subjects of traditional media would never have been able to. But before celebrating the democratic potential of social media we need to recall that Contostavlos was a celebrity, a known artist and television personality who could attract attention on YouTube. Even in this case the number of hits that the sex video received dwarfed those of her response.<xen>14</xen> It is hard imagining the home-made video of an unknown girl attracting much attention. It is hard imagining any teenage girl having the courage to make such a video in the first place. Contostavlos had the confidence and social capital to make her voice heard.

Conclusion
This chapter exposed the workings of mediation by looking at their consequences for individuals who have been exposed by the media. I argue that examining people’s direct experiences with the media reveals the structural changes introduced by mediation and also its symbolic power. Understanding these processes is paramount in making the argument that face-to-face communication is fundamentally different from mediated communication and thus individual rights, such as freedom of expression, cannot apply to both. The chapter mainly considered the witness statements at the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press (Module 1) but, in order to balance the argument with evidence of silent voices – voices of injured subjects which were not publicly articulated – I referred to earlier work that investigated two such cases. The story of Tulisa Contostavlos who contested a situation of intimate exposure through social media completed the range of examples discussed by highlighting the similarities and differences of mass-mediated and digitally mediated personal communication. These are, of course, very different cases but the advantage of bringing together such diverse empirical contexts is that they can cast light on different dimensions of mediation. The witness statements of the Leveson Inquiry – a rare occasion when injured subjects were invited to voice their experiences – suggest that the injuries of defamation, privacy invasion and lack of power to control one’s representation are profound and long lasting. Listening to people’s accounts, one realizes quickly that the negative experience with the media is not just a matter of inconvenience but a far more deeply unsettling and violent experience. This makes the cases of silent voices even more poignant. The discussion of the narratives of the voiceless subjects suggests that the symbolic power of mediation extends beyond the communicative context and can potentially contribute to larger processes of social exclusion, disrespect (Honneth 2007) or boundary-making (Madianou 2005b; 2012). In this context, mediation becomes part of the problem of materialization (Butler 2005) rather than just the vehicle for its reporting. Mediated harm is qualitatively different from harm caused by individual speech in a face-to-face setting. The fact that offensive messages can be broadcast to infinite audiences can amplify the harmful effects for the exposed individual. Social media may provide a platform for wronged subjects to speak back and address their audiences in a more direct way, but social media without social and symbolic capital are not likely to provide a platform for voice. The Contostavlos example is as much evidence of the power of social and cultural capital as it is of the power of social media. Moreover, our discussion showed that personal communication through digital platforms can acquire features of quasi-interactive mediation as the collapse of private and public boundaries in social media can potentially broadcast personal views to infinite audiences.
A theme that emerged from the Leveson Inquiry witness transcripts is that technological convergence can heighten the effects of news mediation. The affordances of online news platforms (permanence of content, storage capacity, retrievability and reach) can turn an ephemeral story into a permanent feature and thus increase exponentially the size of audiences attending to the message. This observation confirms that despite digital developments, mediation remains a profoundly asymmetrical process where the exposed subject is dwarfed by an infinite and abstract audience that is hard to address. The symbolic power of mediation is underlined by the marketization of news stories sustained by an ideology that erroneously collapses freedom of expression with freedom of the market and democracy.
The aim of this chapter is to uncover the workings of mediation as this understanding is a prerequisite to the development of a normative framework of voice as value and ethics of media. Recognizing the structural difference of mediation compared with face-to-face communication provides an additional reason why freedom of expression cannot be applied to mediated communication (see also O’Neill, Chapter 2 this volume). Although the aim here is not to identify a moral framework that can support the articulation of voices in the mediated public domain, the previous discussion directs us to a couple of points. Arguing that individual freedom of expression cannot be applied to news organizations does not, of course, mean that the media should be censored. But an ethics of media needs to recognize the symbolic power of mediation and provide audiences with the platform to articulate their voices, especially in cases of defamation or injury. Policies such as the right to reply (Phillips, Chapter 15 this volume) are important first steps in encouraging voices to be heard, but such policies will only be meaningful if these voices are given prominence and listened to. Tucking a public apology in the ‘Letters to the editor’ page will not counter the damage of frontline news. The structural asymmetry of mediation cannot be entirely corrected but there are ways to ensure that it is balanced with an ethics of care and responsibility. Developed by Gilligan (1993 [1982]) in the 1980s in order to capture the gendered differences of moral development, and since reworked into a more coherent normative theory by other feminist scholars (Held 2005), the ethics of care approach rests on the premise of non-violence, that no one should be hurt (Gilligan 1993 [1983]: 174). It is this principle that can protect from injurious speech and can support our ‘living well through media’ (see Couldry, Chapter 3 this volume). Although identifying normative frameworks will inevitably always be a highly contested process, recognizing the power of mediation and the responsibility that comes with it can provide us with a starting-point around which some consensus might emerge.
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<en><label>1</label> http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (​http:​/​​/​www.levesoninquiry.org.uk​/​​). Last accessed 27 April  2012.</en>
<en><label>2</label> The phone-hacking scandal is an ongoing (at the time of writing) issue involving allegations that employees in the now-defunct News of the World and other UK newspapers published by News International had been involved in unlawful interception of private communications, police bribery and other illegal activities as part of their news-gathering practices. It is alleged that more than 5000 individuals may have been affected by these practices. The inquiry, established under the 2005 Inquiries Act, is chaired by Justice Leveson. http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (​http:​/​​/​www.levesoninquiry.org.uk​/​​). Last accessed 7 May  2012.</en>
<en><label>3</label> The other modules are on the relationship between the press and the policy (Module 2), the relationship between the press and politicians (Module 3) and the recommendations for a more effective policy and regulation that supports the integrity and freedom of the press while encouraging the highest ethical standards (Module 4). http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about (​http:​/​​/​www.levesoninquiry.org.uk​/​about​). Last accessed 1 May  2012.</en>
<en><label>4</label> Although the chapter largely draws on inquiry-related documents, the purpose was not to develop a full study of the whole inquiry (for such academic work, see e.g. Fenton 2013; Petley 2012) but to use the statements of the mistreated individuals in order to gauge the symbolic power of mediation.</en>
<en><label>5</label> The complexity of the issues is evident in the discussions surrounding privacy injunctions (informally called ‘superinjunctions’ or ‘gagging orders’) in the UK where courts prevent the publication of information which is deemed private or confidential. As feminist critics remind us, cases of sexual disclosure are gendered and asymmetrically structured, with women often in the most vulnerable position (Richardson 2012: 158), suggesting that the balancing of freedom of reporting and privacy will often vary according to the case in question.</en>
<en><label>6</label> Both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights use the term ‘freedom of expression’.</en>
<en><label>7</label> See the emerging literature on the ethics of audiences in relation to distant suffering and action at a distance (Hoijer 2004; Ong 2011; Kyriakidou 2012).</en>
<en><label>8</label> The concept of mediatization is related to mediation as used here and, despite increasing convergence between the two terms (see Couldry 2012), there are some significant differences between the terms, as well as among authors who use the terms. I cannot provide a comprehensive review of the term here (see Hepp 2012; Livingstone 2009; and chapters in Lundby 2009 for excellent overviews).</en>
<en><label>9</label> This section draws on the witness statements and transcripts of hearings at the Leveson Inquiry, all of which are publicly available in alphabetical order at http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/.</en>
<en><label>10</label> The inquiry witness statements differ from discourses obtained in an interview context as they are prepared and written statements rather than spoken discourse. Methodologically, this chapter compares different types of data but that is a necessary compromise in order to cover as broad a range of examples as possible.</en>
<en><label>11</label> See Sennett (1980) on the connection between indifference as symbolic power leading to shame.</en>
<en><label>12</label> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v = Nvq2bdn_SKw (​http:​/​​/​www.youtube.com​/​watch?v=Nvq2bdn_SKw​). Last accessed 13 September  2012.</en>
<en><label>13</label> http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2012/jul/12/tulisa-contostavlos-apology-sex-tape?intcmp = 239.</en>
<en><label>14</label> At the time of writing (September 2012) the Tulisa response has been viewed more than 8 million times.
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